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CRISIS IN YUGOSLAV PUBLIC LAW
PETAR TEOFILOVIC·

I.

INTRODUCTION

Writing about the crisis in Yugoslavia is a challenge indeed. The crisis is
overwhelming, penetrating almost every aspect of social life, and
affecting the majority of citizens on a personal level in many unpleasant
ways. Fluctuations in its intensity and breadth occur, sometimes for
better, but usually for worse. Politics, economy, internal ethnic and civic
relations, relations with the rest of the world, even science, culture, arts,
morale are all severely affected by the crisis, and have significantly
deteriorated in comparison with the state of affairs (far from perfect
itself) that existed in Yugoslavia until the beginning of the 1990's. The
ways of ruling, and the functioning of the state's agencies, have been
continually distorted, gradually becoming more and more absolutist,
presenting in many respects a disturbing deviation from most standards
accepted by the majority of the modem world. The crisis has been a
substantial part of contemporary Yugoslavia since the state emerged in
its present shape in 1991, and has persisted.
The domain of law, and public law in particular, has not been immune to
the devastating effects of the sweeping and ongoing social crisis. A
comprehensive picture of the state of Yugoslav public law would
naturally require a much longer article. Thus, this paper will cover two
of the most illustrative aspects in this domain: the crises in the federal
order and in the media.

* Ph.D. Candidate, Central European University (CEU), Legal Studies Department,
Budapest, Hungary; LL.M., Comparative Constitutional Law, CEU, 1997; LL.M. Criminal Law,
Belgrade School of Law, 1993; Graduated from Novi Sad School of Law in 1986 and from Novi Sad
School of Philosophy, Department for Psychology in 1996. The author would like to thank
Professor Dr. Nenad Dimitrijevic for finding time to discuss some issues with him.
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Section II contains, as background, a brief outline of the federal
arrangement of Yugoslavia; how it was established and its most
important features. It also contains basic information about the political
context in contemporary Yugoslavia. Section ill deals with the
development of the crisis of Yugoslav federalism. Section IV presents
an overview of the current state of lack of freedom of the press. The
abuses of the regime have been most flagrant and long-lasting in this
area, since resistance to the regime has been highly vocal in the media.
The conclusion to this paper updates the events described and attempts to
project future developments.
II.
BASIC INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAIN INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF
YUGOSLAV FEDERALISM

A.

It is important to have some understanding of the federal structure of the
country as a background-to understanding the crisis in Yugoslav law.
Until the disintegration in 1991, the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia (SPRY) was a federation consisting of six member-states
(republics) and two autonomous provinces. According to the 1974
federal Constitution of SPRY, the last in force before the dissolution of
the country, all these units, the republics as well as the provinces, were
the constitutive elements of the federation. Both provinces were formed
on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia - Vojvodina in the
north and Kosovo in the south. The 1974 federal Constitution, as well as
the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia of 1974, provided for
a very high level of autonomy for the provinces, which in many respects
made their status equal with that of the republics.
The events at the end of the 1980's and early 1990's wrought many
controversies on the federal level and within the federal units concerning
the then federal arrangement of Yugoslavia. One of the characteristics of
that period was the eruption of nationalism throughout the country.
Some proposals for a new constitutional arrangement were introduced,
but in the existing political setting none of them seemed good enough to
the political elites. Tensions were high; provocations and armed clashes
started shortly thereafter. As a result, SPRY split in 1991 and the wars
for the territories began, ending after the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995.
After this dissolution of SPRY, five new states emerged. Four of them
are former republics of Yugoslavia that had gained independence. The
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fifth, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), is the one discussed in
this paper.
In 1990, during the disturbances that were going on before the country

split, the Constitution of Serbia was amended to introduce many changes
to the previous constitutional order. The constitution of the former
Yugoslavia (SFRY), effectively abolished after the country's breakup,
was formally replaced by a new one enacted in April 1992. It established
FRY as a federation consisting of two remaining federal units from the
former Yugoslavia - the Republic of Serbia (including both provinces)
and the Republic of Montenegro.! The latter enacted its new constitution
in October 1992. Therefore, the present constitutional system of FRY
incorporates three constitutions.
These constitutions were drafted in a very short period of time, by a
small circle of politicians and legal experts loyal to the regime. No
material public debate was conducted on the issues addressed or on the
solutions and formulations proposed. The current Constitution of Serbia
was enacted by the still single-party Serbian Parliament (consisting of
deputies of the members of the former League of Communists) before
the first multiparty elections in more than half a century introduced
plurality and opposition, however rudimentary, into the parliament? As
for the Montenegrin Constitution enacted by its multiparty legislative
body, controversies and opposition in parliament were easily ignored by
the ruling party's majority, and the proposed text was ratified without
much debate. 3 Finally, the federal Constitution was a result of an
arrangement between the ruling parties of Serbia (Socialist Party of
Serbia) and Montenegro (DPS).4

1.
CONST. OF THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, art. 2, § 1 [hereinafter CONST. OF
FRY]. English translation of the CaNST. OF FRY can be found, inter alia, on Internet at
<http://www.uni-wuerzburg.dellaw/srt)OOOO_html> or <http://www.beograd.comlkule>.
2.
The first free multiparty elections in Serbia and Montenegro were held at the same time,
December 1990. The elections were prepared and held under circumstances so unfair for the
opposition parties that it is not clear if they can be considered free at all. See VLADIMIR GoAT!,
IzBORI U SRJ OD 1990 DO 1998; VOLIA GRADJANA ILl IzBORNA MANIPULACUA, 27-58 (Centar za
slobodne izbore i demokratiju, Beograd, 1999.) [Y. GoATI, ELECTIONS IN FRY FROM 1990 TO 1998
- WILL OF THE CITIZENS, OR ELECTORAL MANIPULATION, 27-58 (Center for Free Elections and
Democracy, Belgrade, 1999)].
3.
The Montenegrin Constitution was passed by the Assembly clearly dominated by deputies
belonging to the regime, i.e. to the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists - DPS (former League of
Communists of Montenegro).
4.
The federal constitution was adopted without a chance for the opposition to influence its
contents, by a small number of deputies (73 out of 220, former members of the League of
Communists, and then mostly members of Milosevic's SPS and Bulatovic's DPS) remaining in one
of the three Chambers - the Federal Chamber - of the Assembly of the long disunited SFRY. The
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Generally, the existing constitutional order formally provides for the
strong status of the republics and a relatively weak federation. In Serbia,
according to its Constitution, the President of the Republic has the most
power; this state and political system could be called "semi-presidential."
In Montenegro, the President of the Republic has few powers, so the
Government and its Prime Minister are in a balanced position against
him. The system established by the Constitution is a parliamentary one.
Finally, on the federal level, the President of the mutual state has largely
representative and ceremonial powers and is, under the Constitution, a
body of minor importance. According to the FRY Constitution of 1992,
the highest legislative body of Yugoslavia is the Federal Assembly, but
the Government and its Prime Minister have considerable power over the
Assembly.5 The bicameral Assembly consists of the Chamber of Citizens
and the Chamber of Republics. 6 The Chamber of Citizens is composed of
the deputies elected directly by secret ballot; one deputy per 65,000
voters.?
Since the population of Montenegro makes up only about 10% of the
total population of FRY, a corrective mechanism is built into the federal
Constitution to abate the disproportion between the number of deputies
coming from two entities - each member republic is to have no less
than 30 federal deputies. 8 The other chamber reflects the federal structure
of FRY. Each republic, notwithstanding its size and the number of its
citizens, appoints 20 deputies to the Chamber of Republics. 9 Election and
termination of the mandates of federal deputies in the Chamber of
Citizens of the Federal Assembly are regulated by federal law, while
first multiparty elections for the federal Parliament of the state renamed by the Constitution as the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were held some five weeks after the new Constitution was adopted,
in May 1992. The Act on Elections, adopted immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution
by the same Assembly, introduced an odd combination of a majoritarian and proportional electoral
system in favor of the ruling parties. Many other features to the advantage of the regime (the design
of electoral units; control over the media; ample financial resources; manipulations with the lists of
the electorate; etc.) forced the most important opposition parties to boycott those elections. After
massive civic protests in June 1992, an agreement was reached between the two sides that new,
extraordinary, elections for the federal Parliament were to be held by the end of 1992; they occurred
indeed in December 1992. See also V. GoAT!, supra note 2, at 59-87.
For instance, according to Art. 83 of the Constitution of FRY, "The Federal Assembly
5.
shall be dissolved at the request of the federal government." The Constitution prescribes some
extraordinary situations during which the government cannot dissolve the Assembly in Art. 83, sec.
2 (if the vote of no confidence to the government was initiated in the Assembly), and in Art. 85, sec.
I (in the first or last six months of the Assembly's term, during a state of war, imminent threat of
war, or state of emergency).
6.
CONSTITUTION OF FRY, supra note I, art. 80, § 1.
7.
[d. art. 80, § 2.
8.
[d.
9.
[d. art. 80, § 3.
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election and termination of the mandates of federal deputies in the
Chamber of Republics are regulated by the law of the respective
republic. 1O Finally, both chambers concurrently decide questions within
the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly, unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution. 11
A glance at these provisions of the federal Constitution is sufficient to
show that this arrangement can function only while a consensus exists
between the two member states. Namely, Serbia as a larger member has
more directly elected deputies in the Chamber of Citizens, and has so far
easily managed to obtain the majority required by the Constitution to
pass a statute in this Chamber. However, an equal number of deputies in
the Chamber of Republics, and the concurrent legislative jurisdiction of
both Chambers in the Federal Assembly, make it possible for either
member state to block enactment of any decision it deems contrary to its
interests.
The Constitution contains provisions with controlling
mechanisms in such cases which, however, may secure only a temporary
solution or lead to a parliamentary crisis and extraordinary elections for
the federal Parliament. 12
In practice, the real center of power is highly personalized, personified in

Slobodan Milosevic, and shifts according to the position Milosevic
occupies at any given moment. During Milosevic's term in office as
President of Serbia, key powers were concentrated in the hands of the
Serbian president, sometimes beyond constitutional limits. After Milan
Milutinovic became President of Serbia in December 1997 replacing
Milosevic who was nominated President of Yugoslavia by the federal
Assembly,13 the position of the Serbian President abruptly lost its
previous importance. On the other hand, as President of Yugoslavia

10. Id. art. 81, § 2. Both republics have their deputies in the Chamber of Republics nominated
and (easily) revoked by their assemblies. So far, the deputies have voted regularly in accordance
with the interests of the republic (leadership) which nominated them.
II. Id. art. 90.
12. If an act has not been passed in both Chambers in an identical text, a five member
commission is to be established to work out a harmonized text. If the commission does not come up
with a harmonized text, or if the draft it proposed is not passed in both Chambers in the identical
text, the version of that act adopted in one of the Chambers (which one depends on the area the
statute regulates) may be provisionally enforced until it is enacted in both Chambers, but no longer
than for a year after the start of its application. If by the end of that period the act is not adopted in
both Chambers, the mandate of the Federal Assembly shall be terminated. CONSTITUTION OF FRY,
supra note I, art. 91-93.
13. The President of FRY is not directly elected at popular elections, but appointed and
dismissed by the Federal Assembly. The term in office is four years, and the same individual may
not be reelected for a second term. CONSTITUTION OF FRY, supra note 1, art. 78, § In and art. 97
§§ 1,2.
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Milosevic usurped powers that do not belong to that office under the
federal Constitution, leaving no doubt as to what constitutes the key
decision-making body on the federal level.
All important decisions are made in parallel centers of powers and are
transmitted to relevant institutions through mechanisms within the ruling
parties. At the top of the hierarchy is the current President of
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, his wife Mirjana Markovic, and their
circle of close collaborators. The state bodies and institutions established
by the Constitution, including Parliament, are often used only to preserve
the illusion of legality and legitimacy. In such a constellation, acts and
decisions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary are directed from the
outside, by the centers of political powers, and are sometimes openly in
violation not only of the statutes and general acts of lower legal force but
of the Constitution itself. 14

14. As for the legislative bodies, particularly the federal and the Serbian, they are, generally,
inappropriately passive during their tenns. For instance, in the period from late 1992 until the end of
1994 the federal Assembly had worked only 18 days. See PAVLE NIKOLIC, 00 RASPAOA DO
BEZNADJA I NADE (Filip Visnjic, Beograd, 1997) [PAVLE NIKOLIC, FROM THE BREAK UP To
HOPELESSNESS AND HOPE, (Belgrade, 1997)]. The situation did not improve later -- although the
Federal Assembly could work in sessions for up to 240 days during the year, in 1998 the federal
Assembly's Chamber of Citizens held 24 sessions, while the Chamber of the Republics held only 10
sessions. In comparison, most Western European countries' Parliaments work from 75-100 days per
year (120 days in France). Vucina Vasovic defined this state as "the presidential anesthesia of
parliamentarism." Regarding the Federal Assembly, he points out that "the fragile nature of the
federation," which for a variety of reasons causes the "fleeing" or the "sliding" of powers toward the
center of the executive, is one of the main reasons for the weak position of the federal legislative
body. LAVIRINTI KRIZE, VUCINA VASOVIC (urednik), (Institut za Evropske Studije, Beograd, 1998)
[VUCINA VASOVIC (ed.), THE LABYRINTHS OF CRISIS (Institute for European Studies, Belgrade,
1998)] quoted in Milan Milosevic, Rekonstrukcija Savezne Vlade (The Reconstruction o/the Federal
Government), VREME (weekly), no. 431, 23 January 1999.
The extent of control of the regime over the judiciary was most obvious after the outrageous
electoral theft by the regime of the elections for local governments in Serbia in November 1996.
The opposition parties achieved the most significant success by then, winning majority in all the
major cities in Serbia, but a number of results were annulled by the Electoral Board, and soon
afterward an even larger portion was nullified by the courts. In the second round of elections the
regime perfonned a wide range of forgeries to retain power, by extensively violating the Act on
Elections. Although many manipulations were proven and made public, the Public Prosecutor's
office never initiated criminal proceedings in cases of alleged violations of the Act on Elections, as it
is mandated to do according to the law. The proceedings were initiated by an opposition party,
against more than 50 presidents or members of electoral committees, but the judicial proceeding was
started in only one case, which is still pending. On the other hand, in all the other elections the
courts regularly rejected numerous appeals coming from opposition parties. The Lawyers'
Association of Serbia instituted the Commission for Expert Analysis of the Procedures Related to
Elections, which reviewed in detail the courts' decisions which altered the results of the elections. In
its report the Commission established that the courts in general violated the law in those proceedings
by: not respecting the right of all interested parties to participate in the proceedings (to the detriment
of the coalition of opposition parties "Together"); not respecting the principle of establishing the
truth in the pr~eedings (courts often decided solely on the grounds of unproved allegations coming
from SPS); and violating the principle of full judicial jurisdiction in those proceedings. See The
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THE POLITICAL SETTING IN YUGOSLAVIA

The institutions of the present system are not functioning as they should,
and are currently only a theater, while the real decision-making powers
lie elsewhere. The multiparty system was introduced in Yugoslavia,
Serbia, and Montenegro in 1990. The major parties in the political life of
Yugoslavia and its member states are the following:
The strongest ruling party in Serbia is the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).
Its leader since 1986 has been the current President of FRY, Slobodan
Milosevic.1 5 This party originated when the former League of
Communists of Serbia (LCS) merged with the Socialist Alliance of
Working People of Serbia (an organization which embraced the
associations of trade unions, women, students, youth, and WWII
veterans, actually an extension of the LCS), taking over their huge assets,
existing organizational structure, and the majority of former members.
SPS has been in power, both in Serbia and on the federal level,
continuously since it originated, either alone (after the fIrst multiparty
elections in Serbia in 1990, until the next ones in 1992), or as the
strongest and dominant partner in various coalitions (from 1992 to
today). Originally a left-oriented party of a communist provenance, it
soon shifted strongly toward the right wing by incorporating numerous
nationalist elements, merging both orientations through the years. In
close collaboration with the extreme left and far right parties, it currently
forms coalition government with them in the federal and Serbian
parliaments.

Report of the Commission... , Documents of the Association of Lawyers of Serbia, of the Association
of Lawyers of Montenegro, and of the Association of Lawyers of Yugoslavia; Documents of the
Belgrade Center for Human Rights [Belgrade, 1996)).
For more information on these and other direct elections, the means used in the electoral fraud,
the long lasting public protests that followed, the outcomes, etc. See VESNA RAKIC-VODINELIC, ET
AL., IzBORNA KRADJA, PRAVNI ASPEKT (Media centar, Beograd, 1997) [Y. RAKIC-VODINELIC, ET
AL., THE ELECfORAL THEFT - LEGAL ASPECf (Media Center, Beograd, 1997]. See also LJUDSKA
PRAVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1998,158-165 (Beogradski centar za Ijudska prava, 1998) [HUMAN RIGHTS IN
YUGOSLAVIA 1998, 158-165 (Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 1998)]; GoATI, supra note 3;
Letter from Felipe Gonsales to Flavio Koti, the Chairman of OSCE at that time, (27 December
1996); REF PC-784/96; THE FiNAL REPORT OF THE CSCE MONITORING MISSION ON THE
PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECfIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, December 20, 1992
(printed in daily BORBA, 18 January 1993); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECfION SEPTEMBER 21 AND OCfOBER 5, 1997, OSCE
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Report, 1997).
15. Both the FEDERAL CONST., art. 97, sec. 2, and the SERBIAN CONST., art. 86, sec. 7 provide
that "the President of the Republic may not engage himself in any other function or professional
activity." When he assumed the offices of President of Serbia and later, Yugoslavia, Milosevic did
not resign as President of the SPS, but he "froze" his function as party leader. For objectivity's sake,
it must be said that the same thing was done by the current Montenegrin President Djukanovic, see
infra.
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Another party currently in power is the Yugoslav United Left (YUL) ,
headed by Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic. This party was founded
as an association of several small extreme left parties in July 1994, and,
according to various surveys of public opinion, has never managed to
gain the support to give it alone, more than a couple of representatives in
the Assembly.16 Still, as a coalition partner of SPS in the federal
parliamentary elections of 1996 and in the last Serbian parliamentary
elections of 1997, by internal agreements within the coalition YUL has
more representatives than its number of supporters would indicate. 17 Its
influence in politics, the economy, and other aspects of daily life is
disproportionately strong, extending far beyond the limits of its support.
The Serbian Radical Party (SRS), led by Vojislav Seselj, is an openly
extreme-right oriented party. It formed an informal coalition with SPS
after the elections for the federal and Serbian parliaments in 1992,
through mid-1993. At that time, SRS and SPS entered into open
confrontation in the Serbian Assembly, resulting in the Assembly's
dismissal by the then President of Serbia, Milosevic, and in extraordinary
elections for the Serbian Assemblx in December 1993. 18 After the last
(again extraordinary) elections for the Serbian Assembly in 1997 SRS,
rather unexpectedly, became the coalition partner of SPS and YUL. 19

16. The results of a survey of public opinion conducted by the Institute for Social Sciences in
May 1996, before the last elections for the Federal Assembly (November 1996), suggested that YUL
was supported by not more than 1.7% of the electoral body. A similar survey by the same Institute
in May 1997, before the last elections for the Serbian Assembly held in September 1997, showed
that only 1.1 % of the voters supported YUL. See GoAT!, supra note 3, at 94-99, 152-153. Although
the exact number of those who actually supported YUL in these elections is not available since the
voters voted for the coalition as a whole and not for a particular party, it is reasonable to assume that
this figure was not considerably higher than those established by the surveys.
17. YUL was assigned 16 representatives (1/4 of the total representatives of the coalition) in
the Federal Assembly after the last elections, and 20 seats in the Serbian Assembly (out of 110 seats
secured by the coalition) after the last parliamentary elections in Serbia (September 1997). In
addition, several members of this party became ministers in the federal and the Serbian government.
18. SRS initiated the proceedings in the Assembly for a vote of no confidence on the
government of Serbia. The opposition parties, which at the beginning decided not to take sides and
to abstain from voting in this matter, later backed the initiative, and the dismissal of the government
seemed inevitable. See GoAT!, supra note 3. Thus, Milosevic dismissed the Parliament on the
grounds of the SERBIAN CONST., art. 98, sec. 1 (which grants him the power to do so "at the proposal
of the Government containing justified grounds").
19. After these elections for Serbian National Assembly, the SPS did not manage to win the
majority, even in coalition with YUL and its previous coalition partner, another small party called
New Democracy (together, they won 34.2% of all votes, and 44.0% of the seats in the Assembly).
SPS had to enter into coalition with another party to secure the majority in the Assembly. It seemed
that this time it would be forced to reach an agreement with the largest and most influential
opposition party at that time, Serbian Renewal Movement, to form a relatively stable federal
government. However, the negotiations between SPS and SRM failed, apparently because SPS was
not ready to renounce as much power as SRM thought it was in a position to demand· in that
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The differences in programs among these three partners, particularly
between SRS and the other two parties, are huge in many respects,
making their current coalition appear awkward and seemingly difficult to
sustain. Nevertheless, the "red-black coalition," as it is nicknamed, has
been functioning well so far.
Some parties were founded by the regime in order to confuse the
electorate and cause dissipation of votes that would otherwise go to the
opposition. Such parties usually reappear in public some time before the
elections or when the regime needs support for its intended moves, but
have no real influence in the political life.
The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) is the opposition party with the
strongest support among voters. Its orientation has changed over the
years from the extreme right toward the center, and it is now best
described as a right party of the center, democratically and nationally
oriented, with elements of monarchism. SRM has entered into loose
coalitions with other democratically oriented opposition parties prior to
elections, but its tendency to take a leading role within the opposition,
among other reasons, has contributed to conflicts with other parties, and
to the short life of such alliances.
Mter ''Together,,,2o the last alliance SRM joined, fell apart in mid-1997,
SRM decided to participate alone in the elections for the Serbian
parliament in September 1997, which its former coalition partners
boycotted. Since the SPS dominated coalition achieved poor success in
the Serbian parliamentary elections, SRM seemed to be the most likely
candidate to form the coalition government with it, but that did not occur
(See note 20, infra).
To all appearances, soon after the split of the "Together" alliance the
leadership of SRM, until then in bitter opposition to SPS, shifted towards
the regime in some respects, and even started openly collaborating with it

situation. Just after abandoning talks with SRM, SPS announced its coalition with SRS. The
outcome was further radicalization of the already tensed political situation in many respects (further
gradual aggravation of the situation in Kosovo and of relations with the international community,
worse persecution of the independent media, a new and unprecedented attack on the University and
its autonomy, and the sharpening of the already exceptionally totalitarian practices of the regime).
20. Besides SRM, the opposition alliance "Together" was joined by the Democratic Party
(DP), Democratic Party of Serbia (DPOS), and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS), all of which
were represented in Parliament at that time, and by other smaller democratically oriented political
parties.
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on some issues. 21 Since then, until recently, SRM has avoided open
conflicts with SPS, and in some local governments where it won the
majority even adopted elements of the regime's style of governing. This
caused huge dissatisfaction among its members, resulting in a decrease
of support to SRM.
In January 1999, the leader of SRM, Vuk Draskovic, was appointed
Deputy Prime Minister of the federal Government, while some SRM
members entered the federal government. However, Draskovic was
dismissed from office at the end of April 1999 at the peak of NATO's
bombing of Yugoslavia, after criticizing aspects of the government's
policy in that period. SRM did not join the anti-regime protests allover
Serbia that occurred for about two and a half months (from September 21
until early December 1999), the majority of which were organized by the
Alliance for Change (an umbrella organization which includes various
political parties, individuals, and associations).

On October 3, 1999, a loaded truck suddenly veered into two cars
carrying Draskovic and several other members of SRM, killing four
passengers. Draskovic was slightly injured in the accident. The driver of
the truck fled, and was not found or even identified. The circumstances
of the accident, and the inefficient investigation encouraged speculation
that the accident was "an obvious assassination attempt" by the regime. 22
Since then, SRM is reluctantly but gradually getting closer to joining the
efforts with other opposition parties.
The Democratic Party (DP), led by Zoran Djindjic, is a democratically
oriented party that has participated in the political life of Serbia and
Depending on
Yugoslavia with varying degrees of success.
circumstances, it sometimes participated alone in elections, sometimes
joined in alliances with other opposition parties, and sometimes

21. The collaboration became manifest when the representatives of SPS, and some of the SRS
as well, supported SRM and its leader in the Assembly of Belgrade in its showdown with Zoran
Djindjic, the leader of DP and later the Mayor of Belgrade (President of the Belgrade Assembly) at
that time, forcing him out of office. SRM's member replaced Djindjic and became the "acting
Mayor of Belgrade."
22. Draskovic on TV Studio B, 3 October 1999 - Source: FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (4 October
1999), Internet issue, in English at <hup:llwww.freeb92.netJarchive/e/>. For more details see Nenad
Lj. Stefanovic and Zoran B. Nikolic, Nesreca na lbarskoj magistrali - Atentat? [The Accident on the
lbar Highway - An Assassination?], VREME, no. 457, October 9, 1999.
According to the SRM's speakers, an independent investigation conducted by the SRM revealed
certain facts that connect the State Security's office to this accident. In December 1999 SRM
officially addressed the State Prosecutor's office, requiring an investigation against the heads of the
Serbian and Belgrade State Security, but the request was dismissed. See FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (6
December 1999) at <http://www.freeb92.net/archives>.
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boycotted elections. Since its last boycott of the parliamentary elections
in Serbia in 1997, it has acted outside the Serbian Parliament. When
SRM became more aligned with the regime, DP became the strongest
party in opposition.
The Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS) is a small opposition party, probably
the most consistently democratic and anti-regime in FRY. It has formed
coalitions with other opposition parties. Its electorate is small, sufficient
to secure only a few seats in the Assembly. Thus, it has had a rather
limited influence in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
The Democratic Party of Serbia (DPOS) is one of the factions that
separated from DP in the early 1990's. It is supported by a rather stable,
though small, electorate. Although sometimes giving supremacy to
national issues over democratic ones, DPOS has criticized the regime
constantly since its inception.
Another faction from DP is the
Democratic Center (DC), the leader of which was an initiator and
organizer of the round table of opposition parties.
Numerous smaller parties are active in Serbia. Some are organized on
the ethnic principle - for instance the Democratic Alliance of
Hungarians of Vojvodina (DAHV), or the Party of Democratic Action
(PDA) which represents the Muslims of Yugoslavia. Their influence is
largely restricted to the major part of the ethnic group they represent, and
to a region inhabited by the members of the specific ethnic group.
Factions appear even within these parties.
Other smaller parties have regional or local importance, like the League
of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina (LSDV), or the coalition
"Vojvodina," consisting of several small parties from the northern
province of Serbia. New Democracy (ND) is a small party that has been
a coalition partner of SPS since the end of 1993, but is now its stem
critic. Some parties are led by former members of SPS, or former high
ranking military officers once close to the regime, like Democratic
Alternative (DA), Social-Democracy (SD), and Movement for a
Democratic Serbia (MDS). They have mostly attempted to attract
disappointed members and supporters of SPS.
The Serbian opposition parties acted separately most of the time,
producing a fragmented electorate and a dissipation of votes in the ruling
parties' best interests. Their gradual assembly into larger coalitions
began in mid-1999. A round table of opposition parties was initiated
during the 1999 protests, with the aim of gathering forces against
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Milosevic and the regime. In January 2000, all relevant parties reached a
consensus on coordinated action for several major issues.
In Montenegro, the strongest political party is the Democratic Party of
Socialists (DPS)23. Since 1997 its leader has been Milo Djukanovic
(formerly its vice-president), currently the President of Montenegro. It is
the ruling party in Montenegro, and was the essential coalition partner of
SPS on the federal level. In all elections since the multiparty system was
introduced in 199024 except for those in 1998, DPS won enough votes to
stay in power without entering into any coalition. During the most recent
elections for Montenegro's Assembly in 1998 it was a dominant partner
in the winning coalition named "To Live Better." Divisions within the
party, concentrating primarily on the status of Montenegro in the
federation, surfaced in mid-1997, causing its rupture into two factions,
and gradually generating the severe crisis of the federal state (described
in more detail in the next section).
The Socialist People's Party (SPP) is led by the former president of DPS,
Momir Bulatovic, current Prime Minister of FRY's government. SPP
appeared in 1997 as a faction of DPS during the power struggle between
former close associates Djukanovic and Bulatovic. 25 Although the
coalition "To Live Better" prevailed in the last republican parliamentary
elections, SPP won more than one-third of the seats in the Montenegrin
Assembly, proving it is still an important political factor in Montenegro,
and to some extent on the federal level.
Aside from these two parties with common roots, several opposition
parties are active in Montenegro. The People's Party (PP) and the
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LAM) are the two most important. So
far, opposition parties in Montenegro have not come close to replacing
the ruling party, either alone or in coalitions. In the 1998 elections for
the Montenegrin Assembly, PP and other opposition parties entered the
coalition "To Live Better" with Djukanovic's DPS.

23. In the Montenegrin parliamentary elections of 1990, DPS participated under its previous
name - League of Communists of Montenegro (LCM). The name of the party was changed from
LCM to DPS in June 1991.
24. Elections for the Federal Assembly held in May 1992, December 1992, and 1996, and the
elections for the Assembly of Montenegro held in 1990, 1992 and 1996.
25. After the division of DPS, both factions strove to keep the DPS's name. For more than six
months, even during the critical presidential elections in Montenegro in October 1997, both factions
performed under the name of DPS, with the name of each faction's president after that. Only in
March 1998 did Bulatovic's faction change its name to SPP.
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Ethnic Albanians populated in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo
have never recognized FRY or the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, and
have pressed for an independent state. ,Political parties of Kosovar
Albanians, joined in the boycott by the large majority of the Albanian
population, have not participated in elections held in Yugoslavia or
Serbia since 1990 (except in those illegally held by ethnic Albanians'
parties in Kosovo, for their para-state bodies), nor have they engaged in
the political life of the rest of Serbia in any other way.
Thus, a large part of the electorate remained outside the political systems
of Serbia and Yugoslavia during the 1990'S.26 Montenegro is the
exception, since the political parties of its Albanian population never
called for a boycott of elections, and regularly participated in republican
parliamentary and presidential elections. Since 1996, the Democratic
Union of Albanians not only participated in Montenegrin parliamentary
elections, but won seats in the parliament as well.
III.

THE CRISIS OF YUGOSLAV FEDERALISM

A.
DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL UNITS OF SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
Leadership of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro has long been
homogeneous.
The ruling parties SPS (Serbia) and DPS
(Montenegro) - have been in close cooperation. Potential disputes were
regularly settled informally, outside of parliament or government, and no
severe controversies existed on the federal level. However, in rnid-1997
a crack appeared in the leadership of Montenegro and the DPS, resulting
in the appearance of two factions - a majoritarian faction which
supported Milo Djukanovic, then Prime Minister of Montenegro and
vice-president of DPS, and another faction led by Momir Bulatovic, then
President of Montenegro of DPS. The former was also supported by the
most Montenegrin and Serbian opposition parties, while the latter
enjoyed the open support of the Serbian and federal leadership, headed

26. The regime actually benefited from the massive abstention of Kosovar Albanians from
participating in the elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Because the boycott was joined by a large
part of the population in Kosovo, the SPS candidates had no real opposition there. Thus, they
regularly won in all, or in the large majority of electoral units in Kosovo (about 15-20% of the total
number of seats in the Assembly, depending on the elections), where the total number of voters who
participated in all electoral units in Kosovo sometimes equaled the number of voters in only one
larger electoral unit in another part of Serbia. In few extreme cases, only several dozen votes were
sufficient for an SPS candidate to win the elections in particular electoral units in Kosovo.
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by Milosevic, who was appointed President of Yugoslavia by the Federal
Assembly in mid-1997.
The conflict escalated some time before the presidential elections in
Montenegro in October 1997 when these two high ranking Montenegrin
officials and former close associates proposed two antithetical programs
- a reformist one by Djukanovic, and one aimed at keepip.g the state as
it was by Bulatovic. Djukanovic started advocating the need for
democratization and overwhelming reform in FRY, and criticized the
policies of the leadership of Serbia and of the federal government by
blaming them openly for attempts to centralize the federal state and use
its organs to ensure the supremacy of Serbia over Montenegro. He
pointed to Milosevic as the most important factor of instability and the
generator of crises in Yugoslavia, as well as to then Montenegrin
President Bulatovic for neglecting the interests of Montenegro in the
federal state.
This generated a split inside DPS. The majoritarian reformist wing in the
Montenegrin DPS, backing Djukanovic, decided to nominate him as a
presidential candidate, and he filed his application with the Montenegrin
Electoral Commission, which accepted it. Since the Montenegrin statute
governing presidential elections prescribes that each political party in the
Republic may nominate only one presidential candidate (both republics
had adopted this solution), Bulatovic could no longer be nominated for
President by that party. However, his pro-Milosevic oriented supporters
within DPS held a party conference a couple of days later, where he was
nominated as a presidential candidate by the other faction of the same
party.
At first, the Electoral Commission accepted Bulatovic's nomination as
well, but Djukanovic's wing within DPS filed a complaint to the
Montenegrin Constitutional Court, which has jurisdiction in these
matters.27
The Court accepted the complaint, arguing that the
nomination of more than one candidate by the same party was against
electoral law. Since Djukanovic's nomination by DPS came first,
Bulatovic's candidacy could not have been accepted, and was
accordingly invalidated by the Electoral Commission. He then exhausted
available legal remedies within Montenegro, but the challenged decision
of the Electoral Committee was upheld.

27.
CONST. OF THE REpUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113, § 118 (trans!. by author) [hereinafter
CONST.OFMoNTENEGROj.
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The federal bodies joined the showdown on B ulatovic' s side. He filed an
appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court, the members of which are
appointed by the Federal Assembly,28 and the majority of which is
controlled by the Serbian regime. According to the federal Constitution;
republics are sovereign in matters not reserved to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the federal Constitution, and they
autonomously organize their governments by their own Constitutions. 29
Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court has jurisdiction only in
cases in which the alleged violation of rights occurred in the course of
elections of federal officials,30 while the Montenegrin Constitutional
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to "decide in electoral disputes. . .
which are not in jurisdiction of the trial courts. ,,31 Basing their argument
on these constitutional provisions, all relevant Montenegrin state
authorities held that the Federal Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction
whatsoever in this matter and should dismiss the complaint without
reviewing the decision.
The Federal Constitutional Court nonetheless reviewed the complaint. It
found an indirect way to effectively invalidate the Montenegrin
Constitutional Court's decision and the decision of the Montenegrin
Electoral Commission. In his complaint, Bulatovic argued that the
article of the Montenegrin Act on Elections which provided' for the
nomination of only one candidate by each party was in violation of his
right, guaranteed by the federal Constitution, to participate in political
life. 32 Since that right is prescribed in the federal Constitution (as well as
in the two others), the Federal Constitutional Court fIrst held it had
jurisdiction in this matter; it then found that provision of the Act violated
Bulatovic's right to participate in presidential elections, and fInally
annulled the decision of the Electoral Commission which rejected
Bulatovic's candidacy. Although this decision was openly discarded by
Montenegrin authorities, the Electoral Commission reversed its decision
by allowing Bulatovic to participate in the presidential elections as a
candidate of the DPS faction loyal to him.

In.

28.

CONST, OF FRY, art, 78, §

29.

ld. art. 6, §§ 2, 3. See also CONST. OF MONTEl'{EGRO, art. 2, §§ 1-3.

30.
31.
32.

CONST. OF FRY, art. 124, § 119.
CONST. OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113, § 1/8.
CONST. OF FRY, Art. 34.
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Djukanovic won the presidential election in the second round with a very
narrow margin (50.8% to 49.2% of votes).33 The reaction from the
federal level came immediately. In an attempt to render the results of the
elections invalid, Bulatovic submitted to the federal state prosecutor a
motion for an extraordinary legal remedy (Request for the Protection of
Legality) before the federal court, against the Montenegrin Supreme
Court's decisions on voter registration?4 Bulatovic submitted several
thousand such requests.
Although Montenegrin authorities argued that federal institutions have
no authority in electoral disputes within member-states, the Federal
Court annulled some 2300 decisions, issuing an order that all
registrations accepted between the two rounds of elections were illegal,
and that those voters must be deleted from electoral lists. The intent was
to aid Bulatovic in obtaining legal grounds to require nullification of the
results and to demand new elections. Montenegrin authorities explicitly
declined to conform with the nullifying orders of the Federal Court, and
in December 1997 the Montenegrin Parliament enacted a resolution
condemning the "breach of the legal system of Yugoslavia." Some
Montenegrin officials mentioned the possibility of a referendum on
whether Montenegro should remain in the federation with Serbia.
As January 15, 1998, the day the new President was to take office
approached, the situation in Montenegro was getting more strained by
the day.35 Bulatovic eventually left the office to Djukanovic, while
Milosevic suddenly found himself in a serious confrontation with the
best part of the Montenegrin state leadership. He needed strong backup
on the federal level, where the center of power moved with him. His

33. After the first round of elections Bulatovic received more votes than Djukanovic (the other
candidates lagged far behind them), but not more than 50% of those who voted (a requirement for
victory in the first round). The two of them continued the contest in the second round. Between two
rounds of election, the Supreme Court of Montenegro (backing Djukanovic) accepted nearly 14,000
requests for registration of voters, which were added to electoral lists in the second round. Bulatovic
filed a complaint in the Montenegrin Constitutional Court claiming electoral fraud on two grounds
(one of which was the allegedly illegal registration of additional voters between the two rounds), but
his attempt was unsuccessful.
34. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the Republic. See CONST. OF MONTENEGRO,
art. 104.
35. Bulatovic did not recognize the results of the elections, and stated he would not hand over
the office since the electoral fraud was judicially confirmed. Bulatovic's wing of DPS, abetted by
the Serbian authorities, organized public protests in support of Bulatovic, reportedly to provoke riots
and .give federal authorities an excuse to proclaim a state of emergency on the territory of
Montenegro, with all the consequences that would follow. The protests culminated on the day of
inauguration, but their escalation to bigger disorders was prevented by the police.
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next step was to replace the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Radoje
Kontic, with a more reliable ally, Bulatovic.
In an attempt to prevent this move, the Montenegrin Assembly quickly

amended its act regulating the election of deputies to the Chamber of
Republics in the Federal Assembly,36 and replaced six Montenegrin
deputies in that Chamber still loyal to Bulatovic. However, new
nominations were rejected and the previous deputies' mandates were
restored by the Federal Assembly's Mandate Commission, with the
rationale that the Federal Constitutional Court must decide on the legality
of the Montenegrin Assembly's dismissal of deputies before the
removals would be effective. Kontic received a vote of no confidence in
the Federal Assembly in May 1998, and Bulatovic became Prime
Minister of the Yugoslav government in his place. 37
The next day the Montenegrin Parliament passed a resolution stating it
did not recognize the legitimacy of the new federal government. Since
then, the federal arrangement established by the FRY Constitution has
been practically non-functional in many respects. Montenegro has not
recognized decisions made by federal bodies since mid-1998, and has
refused to pay any of its share of the federal budget. 38
In October 1998, under the shadow of NATO's threats of armed

intervention against Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin Constitutional Court
ruled that decisions of the extraordinary session of the Federal Assembly,
which convened on October 5, would not be recognized in Montenegro.39
From a legal standpoint, this decision was invalid because the authority
to decide on the constitutionality of a federal legal act is vested in the
Federal Constitutional Court, whereas the Montenegrin Constitutional

36. The amendment explicitly allows the Montenegrin Parliament to revoke the mandates in
the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Republics of those deputies who fail to "represent Montenegro's
interests as defined under the Constitution and laws, and with other regulations adopted by the
republican Parliament."
37. See also V. GoAT!, supra note 2.
38. To secure incomes from customs, which the Montenegrin government is not transferring to
the federal budget, in early March 1999 the Federal Customs Bureau sent 76 customs officers from
posts in Serbia to Montenegro, while 68 Montenegrin customs officers were to be moved to various
posts in Serbia. The decision was not accepted by the Montenegrin government and the officers
from Serbia were returned, while 65 of 68 Montenegrin officers refused to report to the newly
assigned duties. See Velizar Brajovic, Jugoslavija - Crna Gora: Carinski rat ,VREME, no. 437,
March 6,1999.
39. See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 74 noA (Fall
1998). The EEC Review Internet issue can be found at <http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>.
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Court has no such power.40 Nonetheless, it was a strong political
declaration reflecting deteriorating relations among the federal units.
This situation, a constant source of potential conflict that could expand to
unpredictable and uncontrollable levels, persisted until NATO's
aggression in March 1999. When the bombardments began·, Montenegro
declared neutrality and distanced itself from the Serbian regime. Despite
several days of bombing, it was spared larger destruction. Relations
between the federal 'army and the Montenegrin authorities were
extremely tense over this time. During the state of war in Yugoslavia the
indications were that federal (and Serbian) authorities might try to
remove the Montenegrin government, which could have provoked a civil
war. That did not happen, but the relationship between the two partners
in the federation did not improve. At the end of May 1999, the
Montenegrin government prepared a document called "The Basis of the
Project for Rearrangement of Relations Between Montenegro and
Serbia." Shortly after the NATO bombardments ended in early June,
Montenegrin authorities became more resolute in requesting redefinition
of the federal arrangement of Yugoslavia, or Montenegro might have
The Serbian
continued its existence as an independent state.
establishment ignored the initiative until Djukanovic revealed that
Montenegro had set a deadline for Serbia's reply. In response, Serbian
authorities offered negotiations on the party level. 41 Talks between DPS
and each of the Serbian ruling parties on the platform presented by DPS
were conducted during autumn 1999, but with no tangible results. 42
The latest developments have further alienated the two federal units. As
an interim measure, on November 2, 1999 Montenegro introduced
German mark as a parallel currency to the YU dinar (the official
Yugoslav currency) within the Republic, and established its own
Monetary Council.43 The intention was to replace this dual monetary
system with the Montenegro's own currency and establish its own
monetary institutions.44 The Federal Constitutional Court, acting upon
the request of the federal National Bank, issued a temporary injunction
banning those actions of Montenegrin government,45 and later issued a
40. CaNST. OF FRY, art. 124; CaNST. OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113.
41. FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (OS, 07, and 08 October 1999), Internet issue, in English at
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/e/>.
42. In mid December 1999, DPS announced that there is no sense in continuing the talks about
the proposed project on the party level, but that the official answer from the Serbian authorities is
still expected. [d. 11 December 1999.
43.
[d. 2 November 1999.
44.
[d. 14, 15 January 2000.
45. /d. 24 November 1999.
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decision on their unconstitutionality,46 but its decisions were ignored in
Montenegro. A customs war is now taking place between the two
federal units. 47 Friction between the federal army and Montenegrin
authorities occurs from time to time, threatening to spark yet another
armed conflict. 48 Montenegrin authorities are effectively acting
independently of the federal state, and generally do not recognize federal
bodies nor comply with their acts and decisions. On the other hand,
Serbian and federal authorities steadily display hostility rather than good
will in attempting to compromise. Voices requiring a referendum on
whether Montenegro should stay in the federation or proclaim
independence are becoming louder, and this alternative might soon
prevail on the political agenda over claims for redefinition of the federal
arrangement. 49
It is unlikely that a unilateral proclamation of
Montenegro's independence would end peacefully. The present situation
resembles the one that existed less then a decade ago, before the former
SFRY split.
B.

REVOCATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCES OF
VONODINA AND Kosovo

A new provision of the constitutional system of the 1990's affected the
status of the "autonomous provinces": although that term remained,5o
their autonomy has been abolished. The federal Constitution does not
mention "autonomous provinces" at all, while Chapter VI of the
Constitution of Serbia (Territorial Organization), includes provisions
concerning "autonomous provinces" which regulate their status, organs,
and authorities. 51
Consequently, all powers related to these features of the provinces are
vested solely in the Republic of Serbia, while the federal state has no
authority in these matters. The highest legal act of an autonomous
province is its statute. 52 Previously, each province had the authority to

46.
47.

Id. 26 January 2000.
Id. 24,27 September 1999.
48. Id. 9, 14, and 23 December 1999.
49. Probably the most weighty demand of the kind so far came recently from the Montenegrin
Social Democrat Party, which belongs to the current ruling coalition in Montenegro: it required its
coalition partners to announce a referendum on Montenegro's future status by the end of March
2000, since that is "one of the conditions for the survival of the coalition". See /d. 20 January 2000.
50. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1990 changed the name of the southern
province from "Kosovo" (introduced by the Constitutions of SFRY and Serbia of 1974), to "Kosovo
and Metohija" (as it was called before the 1974 SFRY Constitution was enacted).
51. CONSTfI1JTION OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 108-112. The English translation of the
text of the Serbian Constitution can be found on Internet at <http://www.beograd.comlkule/>.
52. /d. art. llO, § 1.
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enact its own constitution within the powers vested by the federal and
republic's constitutions. The statute is subject to the prior approval of
the National Assembly of Serbia. 53 The territory of an autonomous
province is established by a statute of the Republic of Serbia.54
Formally, the provinces have their own assemblies, executive councils,
and agencies of administration,55 but the powers of these bodies are
restricted. The Assembly of a province, its highest body, consisting of
directly elected representatives, has no legislative authority; it can only
enact "decisions and general enactments" in the 'areas enumerated by the
Constitution of Serbia. 56 A look at the provision which enumerates the
powers granted to the provinces57 reveals that "autonomy," as
determined in the Serbian Constitution, is very limited, and has little to
do with the concept of autonomy, but instead contains powers usually
delegated to local authorities.
C.

CENTRALIZATION OF POWERS IN SERBIA

Revocation of the autonomy of the provinces was accompanied by
excessive centralization of powers in the Republic of Serbia. This
generated huge dissatisfaction in both provinces. As mentioned earlier,

53.

[d. art. 110, § 2.

54.

[d. art. 108, § 3.
[d. art. 111, § 1.
[d. art. 109, § 113.

55.
56.

57.

These powers are enumerated in Article 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia:
"The autonomous province shall, through its own agencies:
I) enact the program of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional and
social development, development of agriculture and rural areas, in accordance with the
development plan of the Republic of Serbia, and shall lay down measures' for their
implementation;
2) adopt a budget and annual balance sheet;
3) enact decisions and general enactments in accordance with the Constitution and law, to
regulate matters affecting the citizens in the' autonomous province in the areas of: culture;
education; official use of the language and alphabet of the national minority; public
information, health and social welfare; child welfare, protection and advancement of
environment; urban and country planning; and in other areas established by law;
4) enforce laws, other regulations and general enactments of the Republic of Serbia,
whose enforcement has been entrusted to the agencies of the autonomous province, and pass
regulations necessary for their enforcement if so proved by the law; see to the execution of
provincial decisions and general enactments;
5) establish agencies, organizations and services of the autonomous province, and
regulate their organization and work;
6) attend to other business laid down under the Constitution and law, as well as by the
statute of the autonomous province.
The Republic of Serbia may entrust by a law an autonomous province with the
performance of specific affairs within its own competencies and transfer to it the necessary
funds for this purpose. The autonomous province shall collect revenues as laid down by
law."
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Albanian political factors in Kosovo never recognized the Serbian and
Yugoslav constitutional order and were almost unanimous in requiring
independence for Kosovo. All of this was taking place in a context in
which inter-ethnic relations had become greatly disturbed.
Separatist tendencies, present among the Albanian population in Kosovo
since the early 1980' s, gradually became more radical. Serbian
authorities tried to suppress them by repressive means which led fIrst to
the Albanian minority's boycott of the institutions of Serbia and
Yugoslavia and the formation of a kind of a parallel state of Albanians in
Kosovo in the 1990's, and then to the appearance of armed guerrilla
forces known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the proclaimed
objective of which was the armed fIght for an independent Kosovo.
The fIrst guerrilla actions of the KLA are deemed to have started in the
spring of 1998, about a year after its reported formation. The Serbian
authorities never really tried to negotiate and reach a solution acceptable
to both parties, but instead increased the repression against Albanians in
Kosovo, which gradually led to an open armed conflict between the KLA
and Serbian police, later joined by the army.58
The protests from abroad directed toward the Serbian regime, followed
by political and economic pressure from many countries and regional and
international organizations, were ignored by Serbian and federal
authorities, which adhered to the view that the crisis in Kosovo was an
internal affair of Serbia and Yugoslavia. In October 1998 members of
NATO threatened to resort to the bombing of Yugoslavia if the conflict
in Kosovo continued. A day after the deadline, an agreement was

58. The fact that, besides police forces, the Yugoslav Army was also engaged in Kosovo
against the KLA was officially (and only indirectly) recognized on October 5, 1998. At that time the
NATO alliance threatened to use force against Yugoslavia because of the situation in Kosovo. The
Federal Assembly convened in the extraordinary session, and the federal Prime Minister, Bulatovic,
in his address to the representatives, said that Yugoslavia was under an immediate threat of war
(later at the same session he clarified that his statement was not to be taken as a formal proposal to
the Assembly to proclaim a state of imminent threat of war, which it could do under Art. 78, sec. 113
of the federal Constitution), and said that the Yugoslav Army was withdrawing from Kosovo
(emphasis added.). By then, the official version was that the crisis in Kosovo was an "internal
matter of Serbia," and that only Serbian police, but not the Yugoslav army, was engaged in fighting.
See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 73-74 no.4 (Fall 1998),
Internet issue at <http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>.
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reached and the bombing did not begin at that time,59 but the violence in
Kosovo escalated further.
The last attempt to reach a peaceful end to the cnsts was made in
February 1999, when negotiations between representatives of Kosovar
Albanians and Serbian authorities were organized in Rambouillet,
France. A document prepared for signing was again backed by an
ultimatum of NATO that it would bomb Yugoslavia if there was no
agreement. Since neither party signed the document in France, the
deadline was postponed until mid-March. After additional pressure on
both parties, representatives of Kosovar Albanians eventually signed, but
the Serbian regime rejected the document, claiming it did not guarantee
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
The final outcome was that on March 24, 1999 NATO started an
extensive bombing campaign against Yugoslavia which continued for
over two and half months. The bombings ended soon after an agreement
between the Yugoslav Army and NATO was signed. Following the
agreement, all federal army troops and Serbian police forces, as well as
Serbian paramilitary forces that also took part in the clashes, withdrew
from Kosovo by June 20, and international troops (KFOR - Kosovo
Forces) under the auspices of the United Nations were deployed in the
province. 6o
Using the aggression as an excuse, the regime intensified armed
operations against ethnic Albanians, forcing their massive expUlsion
from many areas of KoSOVO. 61 On May 27, while the bombing was going
on, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the
Hague officially announced its decision to indict President Milosevic and
four other high-ranking officials (the President and the Minister of the
Interior of Serbia, one of the federal Deputy Prime Ministers, and the
chief of the federal Army) for crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in Kosovo in 1999.

59. On 13 October 1998, the U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke reached an agreement with
Milosevic. The agreement was signed on 16 October, by OSCE Chainnan Bronislaw Geremek and
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic.
60. See Resolution 1244 of the United Nations' Security Council (establishing the basic
political and legal framework for administering Kosovo in an unspecified transitional period).
61. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around 750.000
Albanians were forced to flee, or were expelled from the country from about March 1998, when the
armed clashes in Kosovo intensified, until the end of the NATO bombing campaign in June 1999.
See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 37 no.3 (Summer 1999).
Internet issue at <http://www.law.nyu.eduleecr/>.
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NATO's aggression resulted in massive destruction all over Yugoslavia
- its infrastructure (bridges, roads, heating and electricity plants,
networks for distribution of drinking water, homes) was devastated,
numerous industrial plants of all kinds (such as factories and oil
refineries) were obliterated or heavily damaged. Approximately 500,000
people have no jobs to return to, raising the already high unemployment
rate to 40%.62 Since the KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo, a large
part of the Kosovar Serbian population has fled the province,63 either in
fear of retaliation from the Albanians, or because KFOR did not manage
to prevent the occurrences of reprisals. 64 The final number of victims has
not yet been officially established for either side.65
After the NATO intervention, Vojvodina it remains the only federal unit
of the former SFRY whose status has not been modified in some way.
While the majority of Serbian political actors did not support significant
changes in its current position, most local political parties constantly
objected to its status. Requests for redefinition of its relations with
Serbia were recently articulated and coordinated. In addition to the
catastrophic consequences of the policy conducted in Serbia and
Yugoslavia since the late 1980's, such demands stress the distinct
multi ethnic structure of Vojvodina's population, as well as various
historical, economical, legal, political, and other factors. Although
voices calling for an independent Vojvodina sound more frequently, the
relevant local political parties do not advance that option. They agree on
the need for some kind of autonomy for the northern province, while

62. The assessments of damage done by the bombing vary from $30 billion to $100 billion
(these assessments do not include the damage done in Kosovo). See id at 38. A list of destroyed or
damaged objects can be found on Internet at <http://www.beograd.com>.
63. The most conservative assessments dating from mid-summer 1999 place this number
around 100.000. See id. at 37 n. 58.
64. For a daily update on the current situation in Kosovo see, for instance, FREEB92 DAILY
NEWS, Internet issue in English at <http://www.freeb92.netlarchivelel>. See also Constitution
Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, in the issues of the E. EUR. CONST. REV., supra note 39.
65. The total number of victims among Kosovar Albanians is still being established. The
estimations in western sources during the NATO campaign mostly revolved around the figure of
about 100.000 killed Albanians. Multinational experts groups for investigating war crimes in
Kosovo, after five months of investigation, issued a report with the figure of 2108 established
victims so far. The investigation is to be continued from 31 March 2000, and current assessments of
the number of victims among Kosovar Albanians range from 4600 (UNHCR, in loNDON TiMES) to
about 8.000 Kosovar Albanians (see: ROKSANDA NINCIC, In Search/or Justice (Crimes in Kosovo),
Vreme no. 463, 9-13, 20 November 1999). As for the victims among the rest of the population of
Yugoslavia, the number officially declared by Yugoslav authorities is much lower than the figure
assessed by foreign sources, although both come close on the number of victims among civilians
"collateral damage" (the former claim that fewer then 600 hundred soldiers and policemen, and
around 1500 civilians were killed, while the latter estimate the total number at around 5000 soldiers
and policemen, and around 1500 civilians killed). See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia,
8 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 37 no.3 (Summer 1999).
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differences exist as to what level of autonomy Vojvodina should enjoy,
and which form of autonomy should be applied (varying from models of
Vojvodina as a republic within a redefined federation, to models of
autonomy similar to the one enjoyed previously).66
IV. THE STATUS OF THE MEDIA - FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS
A.

REPRESSION OF THE MEDIA (1990-1998)

The media has played an important role in the political events in
Yugoslavia during the 1990's. From the beginning of the 1990's the
state controlled media has been one of the key pillars of the regime,
playing a crucial role in abetting the rule of Milosevic and the SPS.
Those media are important means of formulating and directing public
opinion by vigorously promoting each action of the regime and
deflecting any criticism of its policies. Purges of staff members who
resisted external involvement into editorial and personnel policies
enabled Milosevic's regime to acquire absolute control over those
media. 67
On the other hand, the independent media critically oriented toward the
regime 68 has been continually harassed and hindered in its normal work
by the government. Consequently, the independent media has never
managed to expand its audience state-wide, and its influence was, and
still is, primarily local (mostly concentrated in and around the capital of
Yugoslavia, Belgrade). Besides persistent propaganda against the
independent media conducted through the state-controlled media,69 the
regime has used numerous other means aimed at obstructing and

66. See also Dimitrije Boarov, Zahtev lJl samodefinisanje [Request for Self-definition], VREME
no. 469, 22-26, 1 January 2000; Milena Putnik, Political Scene of Vojvodina: Searching for the
Future, AIM Podgorica, 9 December 1999.
67. For an illustration, see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 22-24, 45-46, 64, 79-83, 125
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999). See also ANEM press release: Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia: A State of Repression (May 1999), which quotes that in one of the cleansings that were
executed in RTS (Radio-Television of Serbia, the most important among the pro-regime media), in
one month only (January 1993) some 150(), staff members were fired from the RTS for not agreeing
Available (in English) on Internet at
with the editorial policy of that station.
<http://www.freeb92.netimedia/repressioni>.
68. The phrase "critically oriented independent media" is used to make a distinction with
another group of privately owned media oriented towards entertainment programs, without news
programs or programs with political contents.
69. For instance, from the early 1990's the independent media were officially stigmatized as
being "anti-Serbian," "anti-state," "non-patriotic," "seditious," "fascist," "internal enemies of Serbia
and all the Serbs;" they were accused of being "on the payrolls" of foreign intelligence services and
foes with the task to disseminate lies and anti-Serb propaganda, and the like.
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silencing it. 70 Some of those methods are extra-legal (physical and even
armed attacks against journalists, ransacks of the independent media's
premises and equipment),71 and many serious indications exist that the
regime is behind them. Others are legal, or based on arbitrary
application of certain legal acts.
One of the legal instruments in use is the Criminal Code, particularly
provisions concerning criminal liability for offenses committed by· the
media contained in the federal code of 1977,72 and those concerning
defamation and disseminating false information contained in the Serbian
code of the same year. 73 A number of lawsuits for defamation have been
filed against journalists, most of whom work for the independent media.
Typically, the plaintiffs were politicians, usually in public office. 74
However, this mechanism proved to be unsuitable for achieving desired
long-term effects, such as elimination of a particular medium or redirection of its editorial policy. The defendants had the option of usin1s
certain legal defenses (e.g. truth, fair comment, certain immunities), 5
which made the final outcome less certain. Moreover, the procedural
requirements and guarantees included in the federal Criminal Proceeding
Act prolonged the duration of such proceedings (in some cases for

70. See The Outline of the State Repression over Independent Media (including the media in
the Albanian language, in Kosovo) in the ANEM press release Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A
State of Repression (May 1999) on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.net/media/repression/>.
71. The most notorious and tragic incident of the kind occurred on 11 April 1999, when
Slavko Curuvija, the owner and editor-in-chief of two independent dailies, was assassinated while
returning home.
See also FREEB92 NEWS 16, 17 January 2000, Internet issue at
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/s/>. For other examples see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 60
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999).
72. CRIMINAL CODE OF FRY, art. 27-29.
73. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 92, and related art. 96-101
(defamation), and art. 218 (disseminating false information). In relation to the recent convictions
under the said art. 218, see ANEM press releases: RSF Asks for TV Soko Director Neboja Ristic's
Release (17 August 1999); Journalist Summoned to Begin Prison Sentence (20 July 1999); TV Soko
Closed Again; Ristic Imprisonment Upheld; Ministry Threatens Charges for Licence Fee Defaulters
(27 June 1999); TV Soko Editor Imprisoned (27 April 1999). ANEM press releases (in English) are
available on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.net/media/repression/>.
74. The Serbian Criminal Code, as well as the Montenegrin, provide a heightened level of
protection from defamation to publi~ officials - the prescribed punishment for that felony is more
severe than for cases where the injured party is a private individual, and spans from three months to
three years imprisonment. This concept is completely opposite to the one accepted by the European
Court of Human Rights, that politicians knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny, and thus
must display a higher degree of tolerance (Lingens case of july 8, 1986,7 HRU 307 (1986», or to
the US doctrine, which since the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) adds an
additional requirement for "public officials" as plaintiffs - to prove that the defamatory statement
contained the element of "actual malice" (extended later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967), and in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971».
75. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, arts. 92, 96.
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years), and to some extent enabled the defendants to use fair trial
guarantees for their benefit. Largely because of these reasons, most
cases brought under these provisions have never been decided on the
merits by the courts, but were terminated for procedural reasons, or
because the plaintiff withdrew the suit.
Similar or even less effective outcomes have been reached when
journalists are sued for misdemeanors, as provided by statute. Whereas
fines, as typical penalties for misdemeanors, are limited to amounts
prescribed by law, the judicial procedure for misdemeanors contains all
the basic guarantees of criminal procedure.
Until the end of the 1980's little of the media in Yugoslavia was
privately owned, but was usually founded by the state, its organs, or
various para-state organizations, and was deemed "property of society."
Some of the most prominent independent media has been gradually
destroyed and/or taken over by the regime's use of various tactics,
usually illegal or based on arbitrary interpretations of certain provisions.
In some cases, various legal or contractual provisions concerning
ownership rights of the media have been invoked by the state in order to
seize or ban the media.
In most of these cases the media's foundation was based on vague,

unclear, . or controversial formulations, and sometimes no legal or
contractual traces concerning ownership rights existed. When it finally
became legal for individuals and non-governmental entities to run the
media, employees or individuals legally acquired the majority of shares
or ownership of some of the already existing media. Later some of the
most prominent independent media was simply taken over by the regime,
which claimed that ownership rights still belonged to the state as the
original founder of the respective medium, or that acquisition of the
particular medium was illegal. 76

76. This was the way the daily "BORBA," the TV station "Studio B," and other smaller papers
and electronic media were taken over by the state during the last decade. For more details on the
cases of "BORBA" and "Studio B" see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 46-48, 125-126
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999). The most recent case, which is still pending before the
court, was the take over of one of the most prominent independent radio stations, B92, by the
government in March 1999 during the NATO bombardments. The entire crew had left and
continued working under the name FREEB92, as a third program of Studio B, another radio station.
See Higher Commercial Court Dismisses B92 Appeal (ANEM and Radio B92 press release, August
16, 1999); Legal Proceedings for the Protection of Radio B92 - Chronology (ANEM press release,
24 March 1999).
ANEM press releases (in English) are on Internet at
<http://www.freeb92.netlmediaJrepressionl>.
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Another mechanism in use has been directed solely towards the
electronic media in Yugoslavia - licensing procedures and fees for use
of broadcast frequencies. Since 1991, allocation of frequencies has been
under the jurisdiction of the Republics. 77 Between 1994 and 1998,
tenders for allocating frequencies were not held, although the law orders
they be held once a year. During those years a number of new electronic
media began work without a license for broadcasting.
In May 1997, the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications declared that
all broadcasters had to obtain licenses within a month or cease
broadcasting. The media then faced a problem invented to allow
authorities to be rid of independent media critical of the regime. Under
the Serbian Act on Public Information, broadcasters can be registered
only if they have already obtained a license, yet one of the Ministry's
requirements for obtaining a license was that the media already be
registered. Fifty five of the smaller media were ordered to close down.
At the end of July, the Ministry suspended those closing orders until the
end of November due to the ongoing campaign for presidential and
parliamentary elections in Serbia.
In March 1998 the federal Ministry of Information announced the tender
for assigning temporary frequencies to the electronic media for the
territory of Serbia without stating the relevant legal grounds. Even
media with long-term contracts for use of their frequencies with stateowned radio and TV station were required to participate in the
competition as if no contracts existed. 78 Terms and procedures for
competing for frequencies were vague and subject to arbitrary
interpretation. Many elements had no grounds in existing legal acts.
Although the announcement declared that certain amounts would have to
be paid for the use of frequencies, those amounts were announced for the
first time only three days before publication of final results. The results
were disastrous: of 425 radio and TV stations in competition, only 247
were assigned frequencies for broadcasting their programs. Except for

77. Such a solution is contrary to the Federal Constitution and relevant laws, as well as to
relevant international conventions.
78. The most probable motivation for such a move was that the regime in Serbia used the net
of local governments to found and control the local media. After the elections for local governments
in Serbia at the end of 1996, the regime lost control in all major cities in Serbia, where the coalition
of opposition parties won. Consequently, the opposition gained control over the media owned by the
local governments. Therefore, the primary goal of the tender was to regain control over the media,
this time by the federal government, that is, by its Ministry of Information.
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three members of the Association of Independent Electronic Media
(ANEM), all other members of this association were denied frequencies.
In addition, monthly amounts required to be paid by the stations for use
of a frequency were extremely high, reportedly about 180,000 Yugoslav
dinars (over $16,000 by the official exchange rate) per month. 79 Those
that cannot pay this amount can be ordered to stop broadcasting. This
allows the regime to "tolerate" their broadcasts without paying for use of
a frequency, in exchange for less critical reporting on issues related to
the regime. Under existing difficult economic· circumstances80 hardly
any independent media can afford to pay that much for a license.8l Most
of the media does not pay, at least not those amounts, and are thus under
constant threat from authorities to close them down. Authorities have
actually closed down or harassed some of the media for this reason. 82
B.
THE ACT ON PUBLIC INFORMATION OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA
(OCTOBER 1998)

Another action of the regime directed against freedom of the press was
the enactment of the new Act on Public Information of the Republic of
Serbia in October 1998, which repealed the previous Act of the same
name. The need for "adequate regulation" of public information had
been announced many times by authorities, but the media, not being in a
position to influence the new Act, expected it to be very restrictive. Two
drafts of the statute were released in the last few years, and both were
heavily criticized by scholars, lawyers, and the independent media, but
the objections were not the reason the drafts never reached the Assembly.
Still, the version that was finally enacted is even more restrictive and
violative of freedom of the press than the previous drafts.83

79. The amount cited is according to Uros Komlenovic, Kalil Ferman za ANEM (Katil Ferman
for ANEM), VREME, no. 395, May 16, 1998.
80. Current average monthly salary in Yugoslavia is around $35 (January 2000) by the black
market rate, or around $200 by the official rate.
8!. Those controlled by the government are either financed or largely subsidized from the state
budget.
82. For more details see: supra note 62, at 125; see also VREME, no. 395, May 16, 1998;
ANEM press releases: Exorbitant Fee Demand For Radio Pancevo (September 16, 1999);
Outrageous Fee Demand For Radio Pancevo (July 13,1999); TV Soko Closed Again; Ristic
Imprisonment Upheld; Ministry Threatens Charges for Licence Fee Defaulters (June 27, 1999);
Yugoslav Telecommunications Ministry Continues Shutdown of ANEM Affiliate Broadcasters;
fudependent Newspaper Fined (24 June 1999). ANEM press releases (in English) are on futernet at
<http://www.freeb92.netlmedia/repressioni>.
83. An important reason for passing this Act was that the number of independent media have
increased greatly in the last few years. Despite the fact that most of them have only local influence
(due to low circulation of printed media and low range transmitters of electronic media), their
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The Act was passed on October 2084 in an extraordinary session of the
Serbian Assembly convened three days earlier, and only a few days after
NATO's threats to intervene in Yugoslavia were (temporarily, as later
events demonstrated) eliminated. 85 As proposed by the Government of
Serbia which submitted the draft, it was enacted in an urgent procedure.
Representatives were handed the text of the draft at the beginning of the
session, and the Act was enacted at its end. 86 To aid in enforcing the
penalties in the Act on Public Information, the Assembly also enacted an
amendment to the Serbian Act on Misdemeanors87 by inserting a short
new provision (new section 4 of Article 33) which reads: "Higher fines
may be passed for misdemeanors in the area of public information."
Before entering into analysis of this Act, it should be stressed that the
organs which decide misdemeanors, although called "courts for
misdemeanors," are not judicial but administrative bodies. Their
"judges" are appointed and dismissed by the Serbian government, and
this fact reveals much about their independence and impartiality.

numbers allowed larger audiences to learn information never publicized in the state controlled
media. Besides, several independent dailies (DNEVNl TELEGRAF, GLAS JA VNOSTI, DANAS, Bue -the first was forced to cease work after two huge fines under this Act in 45 days, while each of the
three others has been fined several times so far, and is constantly struggling with financial problems
because of that) placed in jeopardy the long lasting monopoly of the media under the regime's
control.
84. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 36/1998. The text of the Act, in English, can be
found on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.comlmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>.
85. Earlier in October two other steps were taken by the Serbian Government announcing this
Act. On October 5, Serbian Ministry of Information issued a warning to the media to stop
rebroadcasting programs produced by the "services for the propaganda and psychological war of
Western powers" (which actually meant news programs produced by broadcasters in the specified
states). Failure to conform with the warning would be punished, although the punishment was not
specified. Three days later, the Serbian government issued the Decree on Special Measures During
the Threat of NATO Military Intervention Against Our Country. It prohibited the airing of foreign
programs which spread "fear, panic, defeatism, or undermine the readiness of citizens to fight for the
preservation of the integrity of the Republic of Serbia and of FRY." The Decree also provided that
domestic media must not publicize programs or articles that spread defeatism, or that are contrary to
the resolutions passed by the Federal and Serbian Assemblies. The punishment for violations of
these provisions was a temporary ban on their activity, and confiscation of their property (by
comparison, the confiscation of property as a punishment for felonies was abolished by amendments
to the FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE in 1990). On October 13, on the basis of the Decree, three
newspapers (DANAS, NASA BORBA, and DNEVNl TELEGRAF) were closed down by police. The
Government withdrew its Decree after the Act on Public Information was enacted. See Constitution
Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CaNST. REv. 78 no.4 (Fall 1998) available on Internet at
<http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>.
86. For more details on the procedure in the Assembly, which is typical of its work in the
1990's, see id. at 79.
87. Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 44/1989; Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia, 2111990,1111992,6,20,53,6711993; 28/1994; and 16,37/1997.
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The Serbian Act on Public Information contains numerous provisions
that are invalid as contrary to the positive law of Yugoslavia and Serbia
and the provisions of various international instruments accepted
worldwide. Although formally proclaiming that "public information is
free" and "inviolable," and that "no one has the right to illegally restrict
it or forcefully influence the work of public information services,,,88 the
Act violates not only the principles related to freedom of expression and
of the press, but also key elements of the concepts of fair trial, due
process, and equality of all subjects under the law. Its deficiencies are
overwhelming, and can be found in the provisions that set up general
rules, as well as in those dealing with technical details. The failures of
this Act are so numerous that only the most flagrant will be briefly
discussed below.
1.

Prior Restraints

A group of its provisions prescribes the circumstances and procedures for
imposing prior restraints on the media, and preventing distribution of
certain information. The Act prescribes that distribution of press and
other means of public information calling for the forced overthrow of the
constitutional order, jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the Republic
of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, violating guaranteed
freedoms and rights of citizens, or stirs national, racial or religious
, intolerance and hatred can be prevented by court order. 89 The restraining
order is to be issued by a competent court within six hours of receipt of a
petition by the public prosecutor authorized to proceed in the case
(printers or publishers must deliver three copies of each publication to
the authorized public attorney immediately upon printing),90 who may
propose adoption of an order if he finds a basis for initiating criminal
proceedings for a criminal act prosecuted ex officio. 91
The court must deliver the temporary order banning the distribution to
the founder, publisher, or printer immediately, and order the seizure of
all copies of the news or other means of public information by competent
authorities of internal affairs. 92 The court must hold a hearing on the
public prosecutor's petition within three days of its receipt. 93 The court
may hold hearings and decide the petition even if the invited parties fail

88.
89,
90.
91.
92.
93.

Act on Public Information of the Republic of Serbia, art. I, §§ I, 2.
[d. art. 42, § I.
[d. art. 26, § 2.
[d. art. 42, §§ 2, 3.
[d, art. 43.
[d. art. 44, § I.
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to appear at the hearing, to which they will receive an invitation. 94 Each
party may appeal the decision in the first instance to the court of the
second instance within three days from the delivery of the decision. 95
Reasons for the prior restraints enumerated in the Act are identical to
those listed in the Serbian (as well as the Yugoslav) Constitution,96 and
are constitutional on their face. However, the Act is not specific as to
constitutional formulations, which are too general to be directly
implemented in particular cases. In order to comply with statutory
requirements, particularly if followed by a punishment, an individual
must be able to determine exactly what is ordered or prohibited. The
language of the Act's prevision, however, fails to describe the punishable
offenses with sufficient accuracy. Consequently, the provision in the Act
on Public Information is too vague, since it enables the public prosecutor
to ban distribution in a wide range of situations completely covering the
area of "political speech."
For committing a misdemeanor under Article 42, section 1 (see supra at
the beginning of this section), the founder and publisher are also to be
fined from 400,000 to 800,000 YU dinars, while parties responsible to
the founder, the publisher, and the editor in chief are to be fined from
100,000 to 400,000 YU dinars. 97
2.

The Banning of Foreign Broadcasts

The Act also bans transmission or re-transmission of foreign radio and
TV broadcasts of a "political propaganda nature" produced by foreign
broadcast organizations founded by foreign governments or their
organizations, except for delayed programs shown on the basis of
reciprocity determined by inter-state agreement.98 Again, the language of
the provision is far too vague. The key phrase is "political propaganda
nature," grounds for a penalty, but the Act does not define those terms.
"Forbidden" information may include anything that deals with political
issues, as well as a variety of other issues.
Whether there is "reciprocity determined by an inter-state agreement" is
a matter that cannot be determined by a broadcaster or even by a team of

94. [d. art. 44, § 2.
95. [d. art. 48, § 1.
96. CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA, art. 46, § 6 (and CONST. OF FRY, art. 38) prohibiting censorship, and enumerating reasons that justify prior restraint on a medium.
97. Act on Public Information of the Republic of Serbia, art. 67.
98. [d. art. 27.
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its legal experts, but only by an authorized state body, namely, the
Government, and its Ministry for Foreign Affairs in particular. This
way, broadcasters are deprived of the opportunity to make free editorial
choices when it comes to foreign programs. This solution effectively
empowers the state and its administrative authorities to decide which
foreign broadcasts will be included in the inter-state agreement. Having
the power to decide what information cannot be broadcast is to have utter
control over circulation of information from abroad. Thus, the range of
information available to citizens is hugely restricted, and subject to
arbitrary decisions.
Yet another element of prior censorship by the state is made legal,
namely, censorship of information produced abroad, by the state's choice
of information allowed for publication in Yugoslavia, which is also in
violation of the explicit prohibition of censorship found in the Serbian
Constitution (see note 94, supra).
According to the Serbian (and federal) Constitutions,99 only a competent
court of law may establish whether any of the enumerated reasons for
prohibiting distribution of the news and dissemination of other
information exist in a particular case. Conduct which results in
restricting distribution also constitute a misdemeanor under article 27 of
the Act. However, no such decision 'of the court is required in cases
under article 27, which means that an explicit constitutional procedural
requirement is not met.
Moreover, the provision of article 27 conflicts with the provision of
another article of the Act, which proclaims that the public media may
freely present facts and opinions on everything of interest to citizens, and
that everyone has the right to be informed on matters of public interest. loo
For the reasons stated above, the restrictions introduced by article 27
greatly limit the freedom of the media to present facts and opinions of
public interest, as well as the public's "right to know."
The Act prescribes penalties for misdemeanors constituting a violation of
this article. The fine prescribed is 250,000 - 500,000 YU dinars for the
founder and the publisher, and 50,000-150,000 YU dinars for the editorin-chief and the party responsible to the founder and publisher. lOl

99. CONST. OF FRY, art. 38; CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA, art. 46, § 6.
100. Act on Public Infonnation of the Republic of Serbia, art. 3.
101. [d. art. 68.
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Misdemeanors

The Act contains other provisions describing misdemeanors in the area
of public information subject to punishment under the Act. For instance,
the public media must inform the public "truthfully, timely, and
completely," while publicizing lies in the public media represents an
abuse of freedom public information. 102 The criteria of this provision are
vague, particularly that requiring information to be "complete." Since
there are no fIrm grounds to decide if these requirements are met, their
content is subject to various interpretations and depends on the
circumstances of each particular case. This promotes arbitrariness and
introduces legal uncertainty.
The Act also provides that "a public media may not publicize or
reproduce information, articles or facts which violate the honor and
dignity of the individual, or contain insulting expressions and rude
words." 103 The language of this provision does not state that the
incriminating information must be untrue, or whether the correct
information should be punished. This formulation is too broad. For this
misdemeanor, the founder and publisher may be fIned from 100,000 to
3000,000 YU dinars, while the editor-in-chief and the party responsible
to the founder and publisher may be fined from 5,000 to 150,000 YU
dinars. 104
4.

Fines

The fInes discussed above, as well as others not mentioned, are
outrageous. The maximum fIne prescribed in the Act on Public
Information amounts to 800,000 YU dinars (over $70,000 by the official
exchange rate). Several points need to be highlighted in this respect.
The amendment introducing the fines does not specify the maximum to
be prescribed as a fIne for misdemeanors in the area of public
information, and is therefore defIcient, and contrary to an explicit
provision of the Act on Misdemeanors which prescribes maximum fines
to be imposed for misdemeanors - 1,000 YU dinars for individuals, and
10,000 YU dinars for companies. The amended provision is a general
one that applies to all misdemeanors, so exceptions should be based on
fIrm reasons, and should be proportional to general penalties. However,

102. [d. art. 4.
103. [d. art. 11, § 2.
104. [d. art. 69.
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the highest penalties set for misdemeanors in the area of public
information are much greater than general maximum fines.
Moreover, the amounts in the Act on Public Information are much higher
than the maximum financial punishments prescribed for felonies in the
federal Criminal Code - 50,000 YU dinars, that is 200,000 YU dinars for
felonies committed with intent to obtain personal gain.
Since
misdemeanors are defined as the lightest forms of offense, it is only
logical that the highest fines for misdemeanors do not exceed fines
prescribed for felonies. This puts the legal definition of misdemeanors to
a serious test, or at least questions whether the "misdemeanors"
prescribed in the Act on Public Information really qualify as
misdemeanors.
Another question is whether the prescribed fines are proportional to the
wrong done by committing a misdemeanor under the. Act on Public
Information. In the current economic setting in Yugoslavia, these
amounts exceed the financial ability of most of the independent media.
Imposition of such a fine means severe financial burden for the
misdemeanant, sometimes even too large (so far at least two major
dailies, Dnevni Telegraf and Evropljanin, and several smaller papers had
to cease work for this reason). Such forceful destruction of a media is
undoubtedly an unjust and disproportionate punishment for offenses set
forth in the Act.
Under the Act on Misdemeanors, if a fine is not paid, a court may
transform the fine into a sentence of imprisonment according to a
formula prescribed by the Act. If this formula were applied to
individuals under the Act on Public Information, the maximum prison
sentence would be greater than the maximum prison sentence prescribed
by the federal criminal code (20 years), and far greater than the
maximum prison sentence derived from the fine under the Act on
Misdemeanors.
Setting such high penalties under the Act on Public Information will
undoubtedly have a chilling effect, and will result in self-censorship
within the system of public information in Yugoslavia with all attendant
negative consequences. For all the reasons stated above, the Act on
Public Information seriously challenges the constitutionality of the
amendment to the Act on Misdemeanors, as well as the penalty
provisions contained in the Act on Public Information.
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Violations of Procedural Due Process

Like the Act on Misdemeanors, the Act on Public Information prescribes
that the (federal) Act on Criminal Proceedings applies unless stated
otherwise in the Act on Public Information. 105 The latter includes special
rules of procedure in articles 72-74 that contravene nearly all the
procedural guarantees of due process.
The Act prescribes that the court hold urgent proceedings in cases of
violation of public information. 106 The court of first instance must
schedule an oral hearing for misdemeanors prescribed in articles 67
through 69 of the Act within 24 hours from submission to the COurt.107
The Act does not require personal delivery of a summons for the oral
hearing to the defendant, but instead prescribes delivery to a person
designated to receive written correspondence for the defendant, or to an
employee on the business premises of the founder, publisher, printer. If
such delivery cannot be made, the summons is to be "nailed" to the door,
which is considered lawful delivery. If even that delivery cannot be
made, a summons is to be made through the system of public
information, which is deemed lawful and prompt delivery. lOS
By the end of the hearing, the defendant must prove that the released
information is true. If he does not, it is presumed a misdemeanor has
been committed. 109 If the defendant is absent for any reason, the court is
authorized to reach a decision. 110 The court must end the legal
proceedings within 24 hours of delivery of the summons. lll An appeal
does not suspend enforcement of the decision. 112
These provisions are a blatant violation of nearly all elements of the due
process principle. Allowing for indirect delivery of a summons, and
beginning a case so quickly, does not afford a defendant time to prepare
his defense. Instead of the presumption of innocence, the Act brings in
the presumption of guilt - the defendant has to prove, under detrimental
circumstances, the truth of the published information. The burden is
solely on the defendant. Failing to meet the burden of proof leads to the

105. Id. art. 49.
106. Id. art. I, § 3.
107. Id. art. 72, §§ 1,2.
108. Id. art. 72, §§ 3,4.
109. Id. art. 72, § 5.
110. Id. art. 72, § 6.
111. Id. art. 72, § 7.
112. Id. art. 72, § 8.
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presumption that the defendant committed the alleged misdemeanor.
The case may be decided even in a defendant's absence, without the
possibility for later justification of his absence. Finally, an appeal does
not suspend enforcement of the decision. Although some of these
provisions are common for certain media offenses (those regarding the
burden of proof in libel cases), the whole setting is designed so that a
defendant can hardly avoid punishment.
Fines must be paid within 24 hours of the decision. Delivery of the
decision is made the same way as delivery of the invitation to the oral
hearing (see supra). If the 24 hour deadline for the payment is missed,.
payment is enforced by the state. 113 In the latter case, compulsory
payment by the founder or publisher is made by transferring funds from
their accounts to the Budget of Serbia. If those funds do not cover the
amount of the fine (which is not unlikely), the Act prescribes that capital
assets used in the work of the media, and, if needed, all printed matters
as well, are to be seized and sold at public auction within seven days of
seizure. 1l4
As to the editor-in-chief and the "responsible person," enforcement is to
be executed first on their personal accounts. If the funds on those
accounts are not sufficient to cover the whole amount of the fine, then .
enforcement is to be executed on their personal assets (including real
estate), which will be seized and sold at public auction within seven days
of seizure.
The provisions on the procedure for misdemeanors and enforcement of
decisions made in those procedures violate the rights of the accused
guaranteed in several articles of the Serbian Constitution 115 and
incorporated in all (federal or Serbian) acts in force which regulate
various judicial and administrative procedures.
Other provisions of the Act on Public Information depart from accepted
standards for the media, or at least prescribe some peculiar solutions.
These are: provisions concerning right to reply and correction (which

113. [d. art. 73, §§ 1-3.
114. [d. art. 74, §§ 1-3.
115. In particular, Art. 22 (guaranteeing the right to equal protection of one's own rights in
procedures before courts, other state agencies, or any other agency or organization, and the right to
appeal or to apply another legal remedy against a decision concerning one's legally founded right or
interest); Art. 23, sec. 3 (presumption of innocence in judicial procedures); and Art. 24 (right to
defense, and prohibition to any court or agency authorized to conduct proceedings to punish anyone
not given an opportunity to defend oneself).
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exceed limits determined by both Serbian and Yugoslav
Constitutions)!!6; those regulating rights of parties to whom the
information relates (the scope and contents of which is also potentially
detrimental to the free dissemination of information)!!7; the provision
establishing a supervisory body with the power to initiate charges against
the media (with no mechanisms for ensuring its impartiality and
independence from the government's political controli !8; the one
prohibiting re-release of information determined as a criminal act by an
effective decision of a court, except when publicizing the court's
decision upon its order (with a possible chilling effect on reporting of
legal issues)1l9; some related to registration of the media!20; the lack of
provisions that would require higher standards for public officials than
for private individuals in proceedings under the Act (with a probable
chilling effect on critical reporting about public officials).121
In addition, the media and its editors, owners, managers, and printers,
have been fined in several cases for verbatim publication of statements of
opposition political parties and individuals, even when the reports were
fair and accurate. 122
Besides violating internal legal acts, the model constructed by the Act on
Public Information violates the relevant provlSlons of related
international documents. In particular, these are articles 6 (due process
clause) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the [European] Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR);
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and article 19

116. Act on Public Infonnation of the Republic of Serbia, art. 37-41.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. art. 55-60.
Id. art. 65-66.
Id. art. 31.
/d. art. 12-23.

Several legal analyses of the Act on Public Information have been completed
both inland and abroad during the fIrst year of the Act's application. They concentrate on
various problems imminent to the Act, from different angles. The unanimous conclusion
of those analyses is the same as the one suggested here. For a legal analysis on
compliance of the Act on Public Information with the ECHR, see ANDREW NICOL,
EXPERT OPINION ON THE SERBIAN PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW (1998) (Council of Europe,
Strasbourg, 19 November 1998). See also COVINGTON & BURLING, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
THE SERBIAN LAW ON PUBLIC INFORMATION (Washington, 1998). All these analyses can
be found on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.netJmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>. See
also Article 19 (The International Centre Against Censorship), MEMORANDUM ON THE
REpUBLIC OF SERBIA PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW (London, November 1998).
122. See FREEB92, News for 26,27 Oct. and 8, 9 Dec. 1999; See also: HELSINKI COMMl1TEE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, Report on Intensified Repression in Serbia, VREME no. 467, at 33,
18 December 1999 (on the case against dailies BLIC, DANAS, AND GLAS JAvNOSTI).
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (both related
to freedom of expression).
On October 27, 1998, the Association of the Independent Electronic
Media (ANEM) filed an initiative to the Serbian Constitutional Court for
examination of the constitutionality of the 1998 Act on Public
Information of Serbia, which is still pending. 123 It focuses on some of the
shortcomings of the Act mentioned here, as well as others. In particular,
the initiative challenges the constitutionality of articles 27 and 67-74 of
the Act on Public Information, and of the amendment to the Act on
Misdemeanors.
In December 1999, coalition "Vojvodina" submitted a motion in the
Serbian Parliament, demanding a discussion on the repeal of the Public
Information Act. The Act was described by the head of the coalition as
an "instrument of state terror," and a'''violation of basic legal standards."
The motion was dismissed after deputies from the ruling coalition voted
against it. 124
The 1998 Serbian Public Information Act is a clear example of a
repressive piece. of legislation, the aim of wl).ich is to legalize
discretionary and unrestrained repression of the media. The provisions
of the Act form a peculiar system of censorship, combining forms of
prior restraint, and subsequent punishment with a potential chilling
effect, making this law on media look rather like a law against the
media. The Act blatantly negates freedom of expression and the press by
establishing a system designed to enable the regime to exercise absolute
control over the flow of information, and to allow elimination of every
independent source that does not follow the dictatorial rules set up in the
Act. Much of the independent media in Yugoslavia has been prosecuted
under the Act, and some have been forced to terminate their work. 12S

123. The full text of the constitutional complaint (in English) can be found on futernet at
<http://www.freeb92.netlmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>.
124. See
FREEB92,
News
for
21
Dec.
1999.
On
internet
at
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/e/>.
125. For information on the cases tried under the Act see VLADO MARES, MUZZLING THE
MEOlA (Institute For War & Peace, 1 October 1999, Belgrade). See also ANEM's press releases:
INDEPENDENT RADIO BREAK-IN As MEDIA REPRESSION STEPS UP, and ANEM PROTESTS
STRONGLY (l3 September 1999); MAGAZINE FINED 150,000 DINARS (17 August 1999); YUGOSLAV
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY CONTINUES SHUTDOWN OF ANEM AFFILIATE BROADCASTERS;
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER FiNED (24 June 1999). All texts referred to in the footnote can be found
on futernet (in English) at <http://www.freeb92.netlmedialrepressionl>.
See also HELSINKI
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, Repon on Intensified Repression in Serbia, VREME no.
467, at 30-36, 18 December 1999; ALEKSANDAR CIRIC, Vreme Bira Presudu Godine (Vreme's
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CONCLUSION

Seventy nine days of bombing Yugoslavia by NATO in the first half of
1999, as could easily have been foreseen, did not change the essence of
the autocratic regime - at least not for the better. To the contrary, it
harmed mostly the opponents of the regime. A state of war proclaimed
because of the aggression gave the regime an excuse to intensify the
already harsh repression, not only against Kosovar Albanians, but against
all who had openly opposed the regime, and in many respects against the
better part of the population.
In these extraordinary circumstances, repression continued through
vigorous governmental activity by passing numerous decrees and other
regulations. 126 The federal government enacted 77 decrees, decisions,
and other by-laws, while the Serbian president and government enacted
16 decrees that suspended or severely restricted various constitutionally
guaranteed rights and liberties.
Between the beginning and the end of the war, the Assemblies of
Yugoslavia and Serbia each convened several times. However, the
decrees passed during that time were never discussed, nor were they
approved or repealed by the Assembly, as provided by the Constitutions.
The Serbian Ministry of Information issued instructions the media in the
state of an immediate threat of war the day NATO's attacks began,
which set the criteria for reporting on all the events during the state of
war.

Choice a/the Sentence a/the Year), VREME nos. 468, 25 December 1999,469, at 12-14, 1 January
2000, and 470, at 18-21,8 January 2000.
126. Art. 99, sec. 1111 of the Federal Constitution authorizes the government to regulate by its
own acts matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly when the assembly is not able to
convene during the state of war, after asking the president of the Assembly'S chambers for an
opinion. If adopted during a state of war, such regulations may restrict rights and freedoms of the
citizens until such state lasts. Certain rights, enumerated in the same article, are exempted from
restrictions even during the state of war. The federal government must seek approval for those
measures of the Federal Assembly as soon as it is able to convene.
The Serbian Constitution, in art. 83, sec. 117, confers similar powers on the President of the
Republic. During a state of war, the President is authorized to enact, at his own initiative,
regulations that relate to matters within the jurisdiction of the Serbian National Assembly. He has to
submit them to the Assembly for approval as soon as it can convene. Unlike the Federal and
Montenegrin Constitutions, which enumerate rights and liberties that cannot be restricted even
during the state of war, the Serbian Constitution includes no such limitation -- it plainly provides that
by enactments promulgated during a state of war, some freedoms and rights of man and citizen may
be restricted, and the organization, composition and powers of the Government and of the ministries,
courts of law, and public prosecutor's offices may be altered.
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Military censorship was introduced and immediately enforced, and the
independent media carne under open attack by the regime. Some
branches of the media were banned, some were taken over by the
government (such as radio B92, see supra), some decided to stop work
temporarily, and some continued to work against their editorial policy.
All army conscripts between the ages of 18 and 60 were prohibited from
traveling abroad.
Numerous provisions of the Act on Criminal
Procedure were temporarily altered or suspended, giving police wider
authority and restricting due process guarantees. Unless organized by
authorities, public gatherings were prohibited. The Decree on Internal
Affairs During the State of War allowed for deportation of all who
endangered Serbia's defense capabilities for up to 60 days, without a
court warrant. 127
Two weeks after the attacks ended, the Federal Assembly declared the
end of the state of war and repealed the governmental decrees, while the
Serbian Assembly hesitated to do so. Some of the decrees were later
abolished, while others were enacted as regular legislation of Serbia.
In his analysis, Nenad Dimitrijevic postulates the survival of the regime

would probably mean a slide toward military dictatorship and its
stabilization for some time. The fall of Milosevic, on the other hand,
could open the possibility for a change toward democracy. In the latter
case, how the regime was changed would influence future developments.
Violent overthrow would increase the risk of struggle for power without
legal and institutional mechanisms to control it, and might lead to a new

127. Texts of some of the decrees and other regulations issued by the governments of
Serbia and Yugoslavia during the state of war, and the legal analyses of these acts are
available on Internet, at <http://www.freeb92.netimedialwar/index.shtml>.
In particular:
- Instructions of the Serbian Ministry of Information for the Work of the
Media in the State of Immediate Threat of War (issued on 24 May 1999),
and federal decrees;
- Decree on Organizing and Fulfilling Material Obligations (Official Gazette
of FRY, no. 36, 24 July, 1998), and Decrees on Amendments to the Decree
on Organizing and Fulfilling Material Obligation (Official Gazette of FRY,
no. 32, 25 April, 1999);
- Decree on Internal Affairs During the State of-War;
- Decree Restricting Traveling Abroad of the Yugoslav Army's Conscripts
(Official Gazette of FRY, no. 16/99,28 March 1999);
- Decree on the Application of the Law on Criminal Procedure in a State of
War (Official Gazette of FRY, no. 21/99, 4 April 1999);
- Decree on Application of the Criminal Procedure During the State of War
(Official Gazette of FRY, no. 21/99).
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dictatorship, or even civil war. On the other hand, if the regime were
forced to give up its· grip on power, and if a minimum of legal and
political continuity remained, radical changes directed toward democracy
might resu1t. 128
At the beginning of 2000, shared institutions of the federal state do not
function properly. The federal arrangement is undergoing a most
difficult test, and threatens to terminate if not modified thoroughly, and
soon. 129 Neither the Serbian nor the federal government is able to
effectively exercise its powers in Kosovo. A number of current Serbian
and Yugoslav officials (including the presidents of both entities, as well
as the Yugoslav Foreign Minister) are prohibited from entering about
many European countries (all members of EU, and 14 other Central and
Eastern European countries), and the USA, and are severely limited in
performing their functions of representing the state abroad.I3O
After two and a half months of daily unsuccessful anti-regime protests in
Serbia, where the main demands were for the resignation of Milosevic
and early elections on all levels, the Alliance for Change gave up those
tactics in early December 1999, and is now taking other measures.
Unification of the opposition since January 10, 2000 is a big step
forward. Representatives of opposition parties have been meeting
frequently with representatives of foreign countries (mostly the USA and
European states) for several months now, and are recognized as partners.
Though not in power, the opposition thus exercises some functions of
state bodies.
At present it is hardly possible to predict the outcome. As has been
demonstrated in this article, both Federal and Serbian legislative bodies
are systematically abused and are hardly functioning, while the
administration and the judiciary are controlled by the regime. It is
unlikely that a shift towards democracy will come from the

128. Nenad Dimitrijevic, What Language Will We Be Speaking After the Bombs Stop Falling, I
REe
5
(24
May
1999).
Text
in
English
available
on
Internet
at
<http://www.freeb92.netlcasopisJecldimitrijeviceng.htrn1>.
129. The Montenegrin Foreign Minister stated recently that the "referendum on Montenegro's
independence is likely." See FREEB92 News (16 October 1999), Internet issue, in English, at
<http://www.freeb92.netlarchive!e/>.
130. The first list of those forbidden to enter many countries contained the names of about 300
officials and businessmen. See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REv.
38 no.3 (Summer 1999), also available on Internet at <http://www.law.nyu.eduleecr/>. Both the EU
and USA lists were updated in November 1999 to include 597, that is 615 individuals, respectively.
See Vladimir Milanovic, Spisak Nepozeljnih u Evropi i Americi (The List of Unwanted Ones in
Europe and USA), VREME no.464, 27 November 1999; V. Milanovic, Novinari i Bankari·
(Journalists and Bankers), VREME no. 466, II December 1999.
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establishment. It is now especially difficult to believe that Milosevic
would give up power and risk an appearance before the Hague Court.
Another foreign military intervention, which might follow if new armed
conflict occurs in the existing tensed situation, would only make things
worse, with no predictable outcome. On several occasions top ranking
army officials have explicitly stated that the army will take the side of
the regime, if it comes to that. Any outcome, favorable or grim, still
seems possible.
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